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Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing to the Ag Decision Maker
Handbook, the following updates are included.
Important Crop Insurance Dates — File A1-50
(2 pages)
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance — File A1-52
(2 pages)
Crop Revenue Insurance — File A1-54 (4 pages)
Actual Production History for Crop Insurance —
File A1-55 (2 pages)
Insurance Units for Crop Insurance — File A1-56
(2 pages)
Delayed and Prevented Planting Provisions —
File A1-57 (2 pages)
Group Risk Plan and Group Risk Income Protec-
tion — File A1-58 (3 pages)
Natural Resources Custom Rate Survey — File
A3-11 (2 pages)
2003 Livestock Enterprise Budget Prices — File
B1-20 (1 page)
Please add these files to your handbook and remove the
out-of-date material.
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Counter-cyclical payments for corn and soybeans
Farmers, landowners,and agricultural lendersshould be aware of
important differences between
Counter-Cyclical Payments of
the new farm program and the
old Deficiency Payment system
that was involved in pre-1996
federal farm programs. Both
are based on Target Prices
established
by Congress,
but there are
some impor-
tant differ-
ences that
give Target
Prices a
different role
than past
programs.
The Farm
Security &
Rural Invest-
ment Act of
2002
(FSRIA)
provides a
three-tier
safety net for
producers of
corn, soy-
beans, and
other crops,
which includes the Counter-
Cyclical Payments. Two of
these safety-net components
are price-sensitive.
The first price-sensitive safety
net components are the Loan
Deficiency Payments (LDPs).
This system of payments is
calculated in the same way as
in the last several years,
except that loan rates have
been increased for almost all
major field crops except soy-
beans and cotton. The national
average soybean loan rate has
been lowered 26 cents per
bushel from the 2001 rate
while the corn loan rate has
been increased by 9 cents per
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bushel. Exact changes in county loan rates vary
slightly from county to county.
The second component of the safety net is the
Direct Payments, which are 28 cents per bushel
for corn and 44 cents per bushel for soybeans for
the 2002 through 2007 crops. Direct payments
are paid on 85 percent of the FSA (Farm Service
Agency) base acreage and historical yields for
the respective crops. These payments remain
unchanged even at extremely high or extremely
low prices for their respective crops.
The third component of the safety net is the
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs). CCPs, like
LDPs, are price-sensitive.  They also are paid on
85 percent of FSA base acreage and yields, but
the base and yield may be updated to a recent
four-year average.  With marketing year aver-
age prices moderately above the loan rates,
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) drop to zero.
Calculating CCPs
An example of how the corn CCP is determined
will help explain the variables involved.   First,
CCPs are based on a weighted national average
marketing year price paid to farmers. For corn
and soybeans, the marketing year is from
September 1 through August 31. The marketing
year average price is calculated by weighting
each monthly average price by the portion of the
year’s total volume of grain sold during that
month. These twelve monthly prices are used to
compute a weighted average annual price.  If
CCPs are paid, every farmer receives the same
CCP per bushel, regardless of geographic loca-
tion.
Corn CCPs are computed as the difference
between:
1. the national average target price less the
direct payment ($2.60 - .28 = $2.32)
2. and the higher of:
• the national loan rate ($1.98) or
• the marketing year average price.
As shown in Table 1, the corn CCP for 2002
through 2007 drops to zero when the U.S.
marketing year average price reaches $2.32 per
bushel. The soybean CCP for 2002 through 2007
crops declines to zero when the U.S. marketing
year average price reaches $5.36 per bushel.
If the national average prices are below these
levels, say $2.10 for corn and $5.10 for soy-
beans, the CCPs are 22 cents for corn and 26
cents for soybeans as shown in table 2.
Maximum Counter-Cyclical Payments
The maximum corn CCP is 34 cents per bushel
as shown in Table 3 for the 2002 and 2003 corn
crops.  It will increase by 6 cents per bushel for
the 2004 through 2007 corn crops because of a
3 cent reduction in the loan rate and a 3 cent
increase in the target price for those years.
Table 1.  Maximum Corn and Soybean Breakeven
Cash Prices (CCP = 0).
Corn Soybeans
Target Price $2.60 $5.80
Direct Pymt. Rate -.28 -.44
Breakeven Price $2.32 $5.36
Table 2.  Corn and Soybean Countery-Cyclical
Payments.
Corn Soybeans
Target Price $2.60 $5.80
Direct Pymt. Rate -.28 -.44
Breakeven Price $2.32 $5.36
National Avg. Price -2.10 -5.10
Counter-Cyclical Pymt. $.22 $.26
Table 3.  Maximum Corn and Soybean Counter-
Cyclical Payments.
Corn Soybeans
Target Price $2.60 $5.80
Direct Pymt. Rate -.28 -.44
Breakeven Price $2.32 $5.36
Loan Rate -1.98 -5.00
Counter-Cyclical Pymt. $.34 $.36
Table 4.  Corn Counter-Cyclical Payments under
various Price and Yields.
U.S. Corn Counter-Cyclical Payments
Average Price 2002-03 Crops 2004-07 Crops
$1.90 $.34 $.40
2.00 .32 .35
2.10 .22 .25
2.20 .12 .15
2.30 .02 .05
2.32 0 .03
2.35 0 0
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Soybean CCPs are calculated in the same
way as corn, but using the soybean loan rate of
$5.00 per bushel, the direct payment of 44 cents
per bushel, and the soybean target price of $5.80
per bushel.  The maximum soybean CCP for the
2002 through 2007 crops is 36 cents per bushel.
Payment Schedule
Counter-Cyclical Payments are made available
to farmers in three stages.  In years when a
CCP is anticipated, the first installment of the
CCP is made available to producers in the fall
for the next year’s crop.  The second payment
becomes available in February and the final
payment is made in early fall after the market-
Table 5. Soybean Counter-Cyclical Payments
under various Prices and Yields.
U.S. Soybean Counter-Cyclical
Average Price Payments, 2002-07 Crops
$4.90 $.36
5.00 .36
5.10 .26
5.20 .16
5.30 .06
5.36 0
Table 6.  Estimated National Average Corn and Soybean Prices
(Sept. - Feb.).
Estimated Estimated
Corn Percent Soybean Percent
Month Price Marketed Price Marketed
September $2.47 8.0% $5.39 8.5%
October 2.34 11.0 5.19 20.9
November 2.27 12.7 5.46 9.4
December 2.32 7.0 5.46 8.1
January 2.27 12.5 5.38 15.5
February (preliminary) 2.35 6.0 5.57 6.6
Simple Avg. Price * $2.35 57 5.45 69
Est. Weighted Avg. Pr. * 2.34 5.39
* Approximate simple and weighted national average price (Sept. through Feb.)
Table 7.  Possible CCPs for 2002 Crop Corn and
Soybeans.
Corn Soybeans
Breakeven Price $2.32 $5.36
Simple Avg Price * 2.35 5.43
Possible CCP 0 0
Est. Weighted Avg. Pr. * 2.34 5.39
Possible CCP 0 $.00
* Approximate simple and weighted national average price (Sept.–Feb.)
ing year has ended and the marketing year
average price has been determined by USDA.
So, the payments for a crop may be spread over
two years.
Corn and soybean CCPs under various price
levels are shown in Table 4 and 5.
Monthly corn and soybean prices, along with
estimates of the percentage of the crop that is
marketed each month, is presented in Table. 6.
Estimates of the simple average and monthly
average prices so far this year are shown at the
bottom.
For the 2002 corn and soybean
crops, USDA price projections
through February 2003 indicate
that marketing year average
prices will be above the level that
will generate CCPs as shown in
Table 7.  There is a chance that
prices will decline enough as the
season progresses so that CCPs
will be made, but as of early
March 2003 that appears un-
likely.  Periodically we will report
national average prices for corn
and soybeans in this newsletter.
by Neil Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Professor in Agriculture, professor of
economics, 515-294-6354, harl@iastate.edu
When a Contract Obligor Becomes an Owner of
the Contract *
A contract for deed or installment contractfor the sale of real estate (or other assets)between parent and child is not unusual; a
frequent outcome of such transactions is that the
obligor under the contract becomes the owner or a
co-owner of the contract after death of the con-
tract seller, which results in often unanticipated
income tax consequences.
continued on page 4
* Reprinted with permission from the October 4, 2002 issue of
Agricultural Law Digest, Agriculture Law Press publication,
Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included
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Effect of death of contract seller
For installment obligations held until death, the
fair market value of the obligation is included in
the decedent’s gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes. The value of the installment obliga-
tion may not be reduced by the estimated
amount of income tax payable on installments
remaining to be paid although courts have
permitted a discount in valuing corporate stock
for potential income tax liability on liquidation
even though liquidation is not contemplated. A
deduction is permitted to each recipient of
income in respect of decedent equal to the
federal estate tax attributable to the obligation.
For a beneficiary who is not the obligor, the
decedent’s estate is not charged with inclusion
of the potential income from installment sale
obligations as a result of distribution of the
obligation that was entered into before the
death of the decedent as seller. The income tax
basis of the obligation in the hands of the ben-
eficiary is the decedent’s basis, adjusted for
installments received by the estate (and the
decedent) before distribution to the beneficiary.
The beneficiary continues to report payments in
the same manner as the decedent would have
done had the decedent survived.
Disposition of contract to obligor
For deaths before October 20, 1980, different
theories had been used to determine the income
tax treatment of installment obligations passing
to the obligor at the death of the contract seller.
However, Congress in the Installment Sales Act
of 1980, addressed the issue and provided that
disposition of an installment obligation to the
obligor after October 19, 1980, results in recog-
nition of any unreported gain to the deceased
seller’s estate. The same treatment applies to
installment obligations cancelled at death. In a
1990 private letter ruling, an installment note
(the gain from which the decedent had been
reporting in installments) from an heir to the
decedent was cancelled; IRS ruled that the
remainder of the gain on the installment sale
was included in income to the decedent’s estate.
That is the outcome whether the disposition of
the installment obligation is by bequest, devise
or inheritance by the obligor or by cancellation
by the estate representative. Unless there is
some act of cancellation of the obligation, the
disposition is considered to have occurred no
later than the conclusion of administration of
the estate. For obligations held by a person
other than the decedent, such as a trust, the
cancellation is treated as a transfer immedi-
ately after the decedent’s death by that person.
Presumably, disposition of an installment
obligation to two or more persons, one of whom
is the obligor, results in a taxable disposition to
the extent of the obligor’s interest acquired in
the installment obligation. To avoid that result,
the decedent could dispose of the installment
obligation to the other heirs (who are not obli-
gors under the installment obligation) with
other property passing to the obligor.
Installment sale by the estate
For installment sale obligations entered into by
the administrator or executor on behalf of the
estate, distribution of the installment sale
obligation from the estate constitutes a taxable
disposition by the estate. A statutory provision
shields from recognition of gain amounts with
respect to property under special use valuation
and then only to the extent the fair market
value at death or the alternate valuation date
exceeds the special use value and then only if
the transfer is to a qualified heir. The exception
in I.R.C. § 453B(c), for “transmission of install-
ment obligations at death,” does not apply to
installment obligations entered into by the
estate inasmuch as the distribution of install-
ment obligations entered into by an estate
would not involve “the transmission of install-
ment obligations at death.”
In conclusion
The disposition of installment obligations at
death deserves careful planning attention
before death of the seller under the obligation if
deferral of recognition of gain is to be assured
under income in respect of decedent rules.
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Livestock Revenue Insurance: How
Did It Perform?
Two livestock revenue insurance prod-ucts, Livestock Risk Protection (LRP)and Livestock Gross Margin (LGM),
were introduced in Iowa in July 2002. To help
producers weigh the merits of these programs,
an evaluation was made of how LRP and LGM
policies purchased in July to cover hogs mar-
keted from August 2002 to January 2003 would
have performed. These outcomes were then
compared to similar risk management strate-
gies using options on futures contracts. The
comparison assumed 204 head were marketed
each month, enough to comprise a lean hog
futures contract of 400 hundredweight.
LRP versus Lean Hog Put Options
LRP protects livestock producers from declin-
ing hog prices by guaranteeing a specified live
hog price level. Available coverage levels range
from 70 to 90 percent of prevailing market
prices. Coverage can be purchased any time,
and is available for sales 90, 120, 150, and 180
days into the future.  Indemnity payments are
triggered if the cash price index at the end of
the endorsement period falls below the guaran-
teed price.
Table 1 presents the net payback for an LRP
policy purchased on July 15. The maximum
coverage levels available were $40.00, $38.21,
$38.00, and $37.90 per cwt. for the marketing
months October through January, respectively.
The premium totaled $4,727, or $5.79 per head.
The realized price index at the end of each
month ranged from $1 to $4 per cwt higher
than the guaranteed price. Consequently, no
indemnity payments were triggered.
Table 1 also shows the outcome of buying put
options to give price protection comparable to
the LRP example.  Four put options on lean hog
futures were purchased on July 15, at the lowest
strike prices available for delivery months
corresponding to the LRP endorsement periods.
The individual contract premiums were higher
than LRP premiums for the October, November,
and December delivery months, but lower for
January. Without the federal subsidy the cost of
the LRP policy would have been nearly identical
to the premiums for the options strategy. The
options contract exercised in November re-
couped $180 of the $1,580 premium, while the
contracts covering October, December, and
January marketings expired at virtually no
value. Overall, the net cost of price protection
was $5,487, or $6.72 per head, $.93 per head
more than for the LRP insurance.
LGM versus Puts and Calls
LGM was designed to protect producers from
both declining hog prices and rising feed prices,
so it is not directly comparable to LRP protec-
tion. The program divides the year into two
insurance periods, February through July and
August through January.  An LGM policy guar-
antees the gross margin per head (revenue
minus feed cost) for each marketing month
within the insurance period. The gross margin
guarantee levels are determined by lean hog,
corn, and soybean meal futures prices prevailing
when the policy is purchased, and are available
at 85, 90, 95, and 100 percent coverage. The first
signup period was July 16 to 31.  The producer
designates the type of operation, farrow-to-finish
or finish only, and the number of head to be
marketed during each month of the insurance
period.
Table 2 shows the outcome of the LGM policy.
Unlike LRP, LGM coverage was available for
the August and September market-
ing months. Premiums were $5.94
and $5.89 per head at 100 percent
coverage for the farrow-to-finish
and finish only alternatives, respec-
tively. As the marketing period
Table 1. Net cost of Livestock Risk Protection and put options,
$ per head.
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Average
LRP policy 4.15 5.96 6.13 6.94 5.79
Lean hog put options    5.59   6.86   7.70  6.70 6.72
. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
materials can be made available in alternative formats for ADA
clients. To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA,
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Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension
materials contained in this publication via copy
machine or other copy technology, so long as the
source (Ag Decision Maker Iowa State
University Extension ) is clearly identifiable
and the appropriate author is properly credited.
Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th
and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410
or call 202-720-5964.
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of
May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Stanley R. Johnson, director,
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of
Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa.
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unfolded, insurance losses
accrued during August and
September, when hog prices
crashed and feed prices were
rising.  The December lean
hog contract, however,
rallied after the September
Quarterly Hogs and Pigs
Report eased fears of a fourth quarter price
meltdown. Consequently, the cumulative losses
were eliminated by the end of the insurance
period, and there were no indemnity payments
made to offset the premiums.  Note that produc-
ers could have purchased coverage for indi-
vidual months, only, though the premiums may
have been higher.
Table 3 shows the outcome of a strategy of
buying put options on lean hog contracts, and
buying call options on corn and soybean meal
contracts (to protect against rising prices). The
premiums paid on the six lean hog put options
totaled $9,908, but the combined exercise value
was $5,321. Consequently, the net cost of the
put options was $4,587, or $3.75 per head. The
call options on the feed costs offered a small
positive net return, as corn prices surged in
August and September amid drought concerns
in the Corn Belt and downward revisions in
USDA corn harvest estimates.  This reduced the
total cost per head of the put and call strategy
to $2.67 for farrow-to-finish and $2.93 for finish
only.
Conclusions
• Insurance premiums were substantially lower
than the initial premiums for the correspond-
ing options strategies.  However, the options
did offer the chance to recoup some of their
initial cost by the time they expired.
• None of the products and strategies offered a
positive net return, but all of them
protected producers against even
larger losses that could have been
incurred if hog prices had trended
even lower.
• These results apply only to the marketing
Livestock Revenue Insurance: How Did It
Perform? strategies and time periods covered
in the analysis, and will not necessarily occur
in the future.
The insurance products considered in this study
offer some advantages that were not quantified
in the analysis. For example, LRP and LGM are
better suited to smaller producers whose
marketings are insufficient to fill a futures
contract. Insurance coverage is available for any
number of hogs marketed. Conversely, a lean
hog contract is standardized at 40,000 pounds.
Using futures to protect marketing groups
smaller than this adds a speculative element
and may increase rather than reduce price risk
exposure.
One feature distinguishing LRP from the other
alternatives considered in this analysis is that
indemnity payments are based on a cash price
index rather than futures prices, thereby cover-
ing basis risk. LGM indemnity payments are
based on futures prices, leaving LGM policy-
holders fully exposed to basis risk.
A more complete summary of this research is
available at: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/
outreach/agriculture/livestock/
LivestockInsurance.pdf
Table 3. Net cost of put and call options, $ per head.
Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Average
Farrow-finish -3.69 -9.26 5.17 4.07 7.98 11.73 2.67
Finish only -3.69 -9.26 5.62 4.83 8.26 11.82 2.93
Table 2. Monthly indemnities from Livestock Gross Margin insurance,
$ per head.*
Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Premium
Farrow-finish 6.08 1.07 -3.81 -1.21   .64  - 6.50  5.94
Finish only 5.77 .91 -.56 .65 -3.37 -10.95 5.89
*Indemnity payments for the six-month period were zero.
